117 - Resilience Techniques and Algorithms for GNSS Space Receivers in Interference, Jamming and Spoofing Conditions

117 - Resilience Techniques and Algorithms for GNSS Space Receivers in Interference, Jamming and Spoofing Conditions

DESCRIPTION

The threats of ground-based interference, jamming, and spoofing impacting terrestrial and aviation receivers are well recognised by the navigation community, driving many system- level and user-level mitigation studies and technology developments. However, sufficient attention has not yet been given to the impact and mitigation of these threats on GNSS space receivers in LEO (commercial and institutional activities alike). Events of jamming impacting the space receivers flying over areas with known jammer presence have been recently reported, which could cause degradation of the received signal quality and sometimes reduction of the number of usable satellites for PVT. The ever-growing number of missions at the LEO altitude and the wide adoption of GNSS receivers for more advanced spacecraft autonomy and autonomous manoeuvres call for the adoption of techniques increasing the resilience of the space infrastructure. Shared and clear specifications about the threats and related scenarios supporting GNSS space receiver development are also needed.

The objective of this activity is to study and prototype detection and mitigation techniques of GNSS space receivers against interference, jamming, and spoofing, and to define standardised threats and scenarios to support future specifications.

Given the very wide scope of jamming and spoofing attacks, the activity will be defined very carefully allowing the best usage of the limited allocated budget.

This activity is not focusing on RFI monitoring (which is a prerogative of ITU administrations, i.e. ITU member states) but addresses the “Toughening” part of the PTA paradigm, to devise means at space receiver level to identify and mitigate RFI. Drawing a parallel with terrestrial, they implement various techniques, at Antenna and Signal Processing level, to increase the resilience to RFI. These receivers do not ‘monitor’ the environment in the sense they do not store or forward information about the RFI. Their only objective is to maintain the performance during RFI events.

The tasks to be performed shall include:

  •  To study and evaluate possible novel approaches or spin-in technologies from terrestrial applications to improve the receiver’s resilience against jamming and spoofing, leveraging the specific operational conditions in space;
  •  To analyse interference, jamming, and spoofing threats and scenarios and propose their standardisation to support future specifications of space receivers;
  •  To prove the concept through simulations and early prototyping of down-selected technologies.

The main outputs of the activity will consist of:

  •  Technical notes summarizing the solutions;
  •  Results of simulations and early breadboarding;
  •  Definition of threats and scenarios;
  •  Validation report summarizing the achievable PVT performance.

It is noted that no Participating State expressed their opt-out for this activity (EL1-117).